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As critical infrastructure, financial institutions must execute the highest level of cybersecurity as 
the threat of a crippling cyberattack continues to develop. Malicious actors, including 
disenfranchised employees, state sponsored actors, and traditional hackers, all have motivations 
to target the financial industry, and do so frequently. However, the threat changes slightly 
between resource rich large institutions and their smaller, community bank counterparts. The 
complex and multifaceted threat must be fully understood in order to properly address and 
analyze solution options to preserve the security of these institutions and the economy that they 
contribute to.    





Financial institutions are a key foundational element, both to the United States and the 
world as a whole. As critical infrastructure and keepers of currency, shocks felt in the industry 
can reverberate, with extreme consequences, into every element of American life, as illustrated 
in the financial crisis of 2008. While banks, both monumentally large and humbly small, fulfill 
the expectations to keep the variable global economy relatively stable, the threat of cyberattacks 
on such institutions continue to emerge. Every year, malicious actors, a category that contains 
from state sponsored hackers to disenfranchised insiders, attack banks through technical means. 
Some attacks are financially motivated; some seek simply to disrupt and cause the chaos that 
happens when critical infrastructure is seriously threatened. Data breaches, a common form of 
attack, leave millions of customers’ confidential information up for grabs. This conglomeration 
of destructive factors has lead the finance industry to be the highest spender on cybersecurity- 
even higher than the government. (Lagazio, Sherif, Cushman) Although available literature has 
analyzed the threat from many perspectives, two key areas require a more in-depth analysis; the 
unique situation faced by small and community banks, and the insider threat faced by companies 
of any size. By understanding and dissecting the threat faced by financial institutions, the 
increased awareness makes it easier to analyze solutions and look towards the future of the issue.  
The threats faced by financial institutions vary widely in in source, modality of attack, 
and motivations of attackers. Attackers can be generally divided into three groups, with each 
group exhibiting a trend in their attack method and goals. The first group, resentful employees, 
often seek to disrupt business, potentially through a damaging data breach or through sharing 
company trade secrets. (Cummings, Lewellen, McIntire, Moore. Trzeciak) Their methodology 
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can be accidental, negligent, or malicious. (SentinelOne) Secondly, state actors often attack the 
accessibility of resources through Designated Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks. Although some 
of these attacks aim to extract capital, like North Korea, the objective is usually to disrupt or ruin 
the reputation of the bank. (Strategic Finance)  The final group consists of individual hackers or 
hacker “collectives” that are difficult to pin down, using skill a complex arena of security 
concepts to extract money or data that can be anonymously sold on the dark web to the highest 
bidder. (Feeney) 
Collectively, these attacks can be extremely difficult to prevent. The threat evolves at 
speeds that make building and maintaining defenses almost impossible. Though the government 
has implemented a series of policies to ensure financial institutions stay secure, the burden of the 
responsibility falls on the firms themselves- to buy, build, and defend a cyber-infrastructure of 
their own, including ensuring that any third party vendors are also secure lest they be an avenue 
into the institution for a malicious actor. (Mohammed) For small banks, this price tag can seem 
astronomical, surpassed only by the consequences of a cyberattack. (Abend) 
Definitions  
It is imperative, when discussing cybersecurity, to clarify terms. In this paper, “financial 
industries” will be defined  as “a vast assortment of firms, agencies, and institutions with 
operations ranging from small community banks to massive, international corporations” 
(Mohammed). The term will be used interchangeably with “banks”. Malicious actors are defined 
as “an entity that is partially or wholly responsible for a security incident that impacts- or has the 
potential to impact- an organization’s security” (BeyondTrust.com). The term “malicious actors” 
is used to describe all types of actors as above, and used interchangeably with the term “threat 
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actors.” Cybersecurity will be a combined term, as to illustrate the unique threat faced by 
institutions that is indivisible and unique. (CyberPedia) 
Understanding the Threat 
The Department of Homeland Security lists the financial sector as critical infrastructure 
in the United States that is vulnerable to a variety of threats- including, perhaps the most 
pressing, the threat of cyberattacks. (DHS) A large-scale cyberattack could bring nearly every 
element of American life to a grinding halt. Depending on the attack, citizens might be unable to 
utilize their banking cards to purchase goods or extract cash, have their bank accounts emptied 
without a trace, or experience the consequences of an economic meltdown. For these reasons, the 
banking industry has a solemn responsibility for keeping customers and assets secure. However, 
the types of attacks face by banks are varied, intricate, and complex.  
Malicious actors have no shortage of avenues into banks. Phishing, the practice of 
targeting unsuspecting employees with emails that allow threat actors onto their device or the 
company’s network, are extremely successful despite training programs because no amount of 
security software can completely mitigate human fallibility. This can also be true of websites 
embedded with malicious software that threat actors lure employees and bring down a system in 
a single click. State actors or malicious actors hoping to gain access to a firm’s internal system 
frequently utilize phishing.  
Once malicious actors have gained access into a system, two scenarios can play out. If 
the bank has security measures in place within the bank’s online systems, the threat actor can be 
stopped or at least slowed down as the intruder is forced to develop another solution. Sometimes, 
these malicious actors are slowed down to the point where they can be detected by security 
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specialists monitoring the intranet. Alternatively, if a firm has not invested in these additional 
security measures, a malicious actor will have free reign to all resources, from employee and 
consumer data to trade secrets. (Mitnick) In the 2013 Carbanak attacks, for example, a method 
known as spear phishing was used to install bank employee’s computers with malware that 
allowed threat actors to capture video footage of bank employees completing key daily activities, 
such as transferring funds and bypassing security measures. These attacks alone affected more 
than 100 banks and stole a range of $2.5 million to $10 million from each bank. (Johnson) For 
this reason, it is imperative that firms have online security measures in place for both internal 
and external threats. 
Third party providers also supply an often-overlooked path into a company. Any firm that 
provides services to the bank, ranging from health care providers to cloud service providers, has 
their own cybersecurity measures. Malicious actors could potentially exploit a vulnerability in 
the third party’s cybersecurity to trespass into the intended target. Larger financial institutions 
may have the resources to ensure their third party suppliers are secure, but few factor this key 
element into their cybersecurity program, and most small or community banks cannot afford it. 
(Feeney) Third party vendors are an increasingly large target for state sponsored actors looking 
for avenues into a firm’s network. Malicious actors seeking a data breach can utilize the trusting 
connection between third parties and firms to expose sensitive data.  
Finally, the growing use of internet and mobile banking provides an easy way for 
malicious actors to access resources and commit fraud. (Castelluccio) Banks frequently enact 
security measures that are rejected by consumers for complicating a process sold on based on its 
perceived convenience. (Fattahleh, Mercadi, Meharia, Panja, Robinson) However, by rejecting 
these measures, customers inadvertently put themselves at risk for fraud. A study by a collection 
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of students at the University of Michigan found that accessing a mobile banking account on a 
device is astonishingly simple, as many of the security features are disabled by the consumer. 
The authors of the study found that if a consumer has disabled the screen lock on the mobile 
device and opted for the auto-filling of the mobile banking username associated with their 
account, the malicious actor needs only to crack the password to gain complete and unfettered 
access into the account. (Fattahleh, Mercadi, Meharia, Panja, Robinson) Although many banking 
institutions insist on passwords that feature a variety of characters and must be changed 
regularly, customers frustrated with the task of frequently conjuring a new complicated password 
often opt for only slight iterations of their previous password. Malicious actors with a focus on 
password cracking find many of these passwords, the majority of which follow a basic pattern 
(numbers and characters at the end, alphanumeric substitutions) to be easily exploited. (Rankin) 
Once access into the account is gained, it is easy to begin the process of fraud.  
These fraudulent attacks are an easy way for cybercriminals to profit. Media has 
portrayed this circumstance dramatically, insinuating that malicious actors can empty bank 
accounts with a single click and still manage to avoid prosecution or identification. (Close-Up 
Media) However, in order to keep their malicious intentions hidden and to remain covert, most 
of these attacks follow a pattern of taking negligible amounts of money- say, a few cents to a few 
dollars- out of an account. These infinitesimal extractions are extremely challenging for fraud 
investigators to identify and pursue, and are often lost in the noise of millions of daily 
transactions. (Bronk, Monk, Villasenor) However, taking small amounts of money from 
thousands or millions of accounts can easily add up to numbers in the millions. In fact, a book 
addressing the issue published in 2016 states that US$1 billion has been hacked from banks since 
2013, demonstrating the severity of the issue at hand. (Taplin)  
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In a recent related case, malicious actors we now know to be associated with North Korea 
seized US$81 million from the Bangladesh Bank’s account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. (Reuters) These funds are likely being used to fund the North Korean missile development 
program. This attack itself was relatively simple and intuitive, and the transfers were allowed 
even though none of the requests were formatted correctly in the first place. Though the majority 
of their intended financial gain was blocked (the original goal was $951 million), US$81 million 
is still a hefty sum for a situation that could have been avoided with more internal safeguards. 
(Bukth, Huda) Just like with successful terrorist attacks, it is almost guaranteed there will be 
copycat attacks in the future.   
Despite the obvious threats, the financial industry as a whole is woefully underprepared 
for such attacks. Although a PricewaterhouseCooper study found that 75% of surveyed banks 
intended to increase funding for cybersecurity in the next twelve months, another longitudinal 
study found that 54% of their respondents say “financial loses aren’t high enough from 
cyberattacks to warrant broad level attention”. (Wee, Close Up Media) Considering the above 
information, this simply is not true. In fact, the same article, published by Finance Asia includes 
a quote from a key cybersecurity professional that “[The banks my firm has worked with] have 
all been compromised to some extent. Everyone we have investigated has had a breach. Every 
bank that we have done an assessment has been compromised by malware they didn’t know was 
there”. (Wee) Additionally, a study conducted by the Ponemon Institute found that 
“organizations that utilize security intelligence technologies reported having significantly lower 
costs than organizations that did not employ them”. (Johnson) Clearly, a severe disconnect exists 
between the threats perceived by the banks and the actual threat that exists from malicious actors.  
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This disconnect was demonstrated in a study conducted by two students at Dakota State 
University that compared the self-disclosed cybersecurity risks of large U.S. banks to the actual 
threat as found by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Underreporting of risks is chronic 
although not always intentional; as banks strive to show customers that the money they entrust is 
safe. However, “these inaccuracies can result in an inflated stock price and a reduced 
understanding of the corporations true information security risks” which could have devastating 
consequences should a firm that has underreported become a target of a well-executed 
cyberattack. The study found that “in 2014, the study entities did not report 33% of the risks 
found within their business domains”. Thirty-three percent is a significant number that could 
easily have severe consequences if not addressed. The study found that as banks mature 
cybersecurity programs and receive increased guidance on reporting, the number of risks 
decreases.  (Bakker, Streff) 
Bank Size versus Threat Faced  
When approaching this extremely nuanced issue, one of the key factors to be analyzed is 
the impact that the size of a financial institution has on the types of attacks they face and their 
defenses against them. Although it may seem like an obvious solution for large banks with 
plentiful resources, employing this strategy exclusively is unlikely to provide a long-term 
solution to the complex issue at hand. Interestingly, many large institutions have been found that 
“overspending on defense measures and chronic underreporting has also had an important 
consequence at both overall sector and society levels, potentially driving the cost of cybercrime 
even further upward”. (Lagazio, Sherif, Cushman). These large institutions may have the 
resources necessary to create a significant security platform, but they are misused, leading to, in 
some cases, a widening of the security gap. However, if an attack did occur, the bank could point 
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to the money spent on cybersecurity to relieve the blame and attempt to reassure customers. In 
fact, some banks have band-aid policies in which, instead of identifying the underlying issue, a 
vulnerability is simply patched or a new protocol written. This leads to a convoluted maze of 
overlapping patches and redundant protocols. (Mohammed) 
For smaller banks, who have fewer financial resources to devote to cybersecurity, the 
threat only multiplies in size. According to one source, community banks compose over 96% of 
all U.S. Banks (Westchester County Business Journal). If this figure is to be believed, 
community banks are even more fundamental to protect in the eye of the cyber threat. A Chief 
Information Security Officer at a small bank on the East Coast put it bluntly, “smaller banks still 
have the same challenges as larger banks do, but not the same resources”. (Westchester County 
Business Journal) To put the issue in perspective, a Symantec study reported that half of attacks 
aimed at financial institutions targeted those banks with less than 2,500 employees. However, 
smaller banks are more likely to be aware of the risk, as 85% reported being extremely 
concerned about the cyber threat. (Bank Director).  
Of course, everyone has a different theory on what is the best course of action for smaller 
institutions to pursue. If smaller banks cannot find the space in the budget to create an entire 
department dedicated to cyber defense, it would be advisable to hire third party security 
providers to monitor their networks (not to be confused with third party providers of other 
services noted as a vulnerability above). (Abend) A benefit of utilizing third party security 
providers comes with the ability of these providers to process threat data, including data from 
intrusion detection systems and firewalls, which would simply be impossible for a small bank’s 
security department to properly process. (BankNews) A key regulator at the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency recommends that community banks start by conducting a 
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comprehensive risk assessment that “1) identifies internal assets and processes, 2) describes 
external threats to themselves, third parties and the sector as a whole, and 3) outlines their 
vulnerabilities to these threats”. (Abend) Public-private information sharing also provides an 
important opportunity for community banks to gain valuable threat intelligence at an inexpensive 
price. (Abend) Interestingly, community banks have already had success utilizing the close 
relationships with individual customers to inform them of the threats and disseminate 
information to improve the patron’s security. In this way, small banks have a strength that 
impersonal big banks lack.  
The Insider Threat 
However, nothing renders banks immune to one of the most severe threats faced by the 
banking industry with regard to cybercrime: the insider threat. A study conducted by the 
Software Engineering Institute defines a malicious insider as “a current or former employee, 
contractors, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to an organization 
network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that 
negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information 
or information systems”. (Cappelli). The study, deemed one of the preeminent pieces of literature 
on the subject, discovered six critical findings; criminals used a prolonged amount of low level 
activity both accomplished more damage and remained undetected for longer; insiders means 
were not frequently technically advanced; managers committing fraud accomplished much more 
damage than their non-manager counterparts; incidents of collusion were infrequent; audits are 
the best way to identify malicious employees; and personally identifiable information is the most 
frequent target of these attacks. (Cummings, Lewellen, McIntire, Moore, Trzeciak). This 
information is vital if companies are to take action against this dangerous threat.  
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Another study found three identifiable distinctions in the types of attacks conducted by 
insiders; accidental, negligent, or malicious. According to Verizon’s 2016 Data Breach Incident 
Report as quoted by SentinelOne, 30% of insider damage was simply accidental- employees 
simply are not educated enough on cyber activity to utilize industry best practices. The next 
category, negligent damage, occurs when “employees try to avoid the policies you’ve put in 
place to protect endpoints and valuable data”. (Sentinel One) Employees, like consumers, can be 
immune to measures carefully put in place to protect information in the name of laziness.  
Finally, malicious insiders are most likely to cause the most damage. This category could include 
employees that feel they have been treated unfairly, have become disenfranchised with the 
company, or have recently been laid off. These employees can conduct a variety of destructive 
threats, including extracting sensitive company data to which they have access and selling it to 
the highest bidder, or committing fraud with their resources to pad their own pockets. 
Considering Consequences  
The consequences felt by financial institutions in the wake of cyberattacks are nearly as 
destructive as the events themselves. As critical infrastructure, banks are vulnerable to one type 
of attack that other institutions may not be- the threat of the domino or contagion effect. Partially 
witnessed in 2008, the domino effect occurs when “one prominent entity of interconnected 
company [being attacked…leads to] sound financial institutions become viewed as weak, and 
panicked customers withdraw funds from sound entities, causing sound businesses to fail”. 
(Weiss) Put simply, if one bank experiences a significant attack, it is likely that customers of 
other banks could become worried about the security of their money and withdraw their funds, 
causing banks that would otherwise be healthy to collapse as they do not have the actual assets to 
repay their customers. This is an end game scenario, in which a successfully conducted attack on 
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one bank causes a collapse in the national economy and, quite possibly, the world economy as 
well.  
A more common and noted threat faced by financial institutions of shapes and sizes is 
that of data breaches. Data breaches can contain information regarding a variety of elements, 
including company trade information or personal information. One source notes that “cyber 
criminals love to loot employee or customer personal information, such as Social Security 
numbers, dates of birth, mothers’ maiden names, addresses, account numbers and passcodes”. 
(Muig, Smith, and Stambaugh) This information can be sold to any number of customers to use it 
for further nefarious purposes. A perfect and terrifying example of large-scale data breach was 
the infamous Equifax data breach of September 2017. Ultimately, the information of 145.5 
million Americans, nearly half the population was released, causing a loss of confidentiality that 
is devastating and irreversible. (Moore) The company itself is likely to experience “stock market 
volatility and significantly reduced normal stock returns” after such a breach (Corbet, Gurdgiev) 
The damage does not stop after the information is released- secondary consequences, in which 
the released data is manipulated to cause further damage, are likely after a breach such as the 
Equifax cataclysm. Already, experts are predicting an increase in healthcare fraud and 
entitlement fraud as the consequences from this one cyberattack radiate into other industries. 
(Moore)  It is easy to say that a solution could be found if customers had more control of how 
their data is used and distributed, but a lack of regulations about the following and the 
widespread willingness of customers to give their personal information to institutions they trust 
prove this is an over simplified solution. In reality, the threat to information is almost impossible 
to mitigate except by increasing security measures.  
 




Obviously, such a wide-ranging problem has a plethora of solutions to choose from, 
ranging from technical endpoint structures to increased government regulations. Some argue 
that, with the threat continuing to spiral, increasing the complexity and range of encryption is the 
only way to protect data from being stolen. (Castelluccio) However, taken individually, this 
solution is unlikely to stop malicious actors who enjoy the challenge of cracking measures like 
encryption.  Regulatory issues are often a point of contention, as they can be perceived 
differently by different groups involved. However, overall  government regulations are a great 
way to ensure a minimum bottom line of security for financial institutions. (Mohammed) 
However, in order to be effective, these regulations will need to be clearly written and enforced, 
challenges that have plagued the American government since its conception. 
 Information sharing is another arena that may show an opportunity for improvement. By 
creating voluntary public-private information sharing portals like those that already exist for 
physical threats, threat intelligence becomes a much more advantageous tool for protecting 
financial institutions. However, in order for such portals to be successful, companies would have 
to acknowledge the benefits enough to share their information.  
Concerning the end-user space, experts have been floating the idea of multi-factor 
authentication (MFA) or nontraditional authentication efforts. In the words of one expert leading 
the charge, “In a world where bad actors already know most everybody’s name, Social Security 
number and address, it is grossly imprudent to continue to use a system where authentication is 
based entirely on information that we all know has been compromised”. (Moore) However, 
developing a new, secure system for authentication would take extreme amounts of time and 
resources, and may not even be accepted by the people it is intended to protect.  
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A problem faced by many companies that contributes to shaky cybersecurity is the lack 
of maintenance applied to keeping expensive cyber security platforms active and clutter-free- 
they require constant upkeep to remain active. Many times, companies will purchase these 
platforms assuming they are a one-step solution, but in reality these are only tools that require 
constant attention to remain productive at their full potential. One expert puts it simply, “cyber 
security isn’t a ‘set it and forget it’ situation”. (Morris)  
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the responsibility for cybersecurity of financial institutions lies with everyone 
it comprises of, from security engineers to C-suite officials to tellers to costumers. In order to 
thwart the monumental threat of malicious actors targeting banks, small and large banks must be 
acutely aware of the specific risks they face and prepared to face such risks appropriately. These 
malicious actors are not uniform. They include insiders, state sponsored actors, and 
cybercriminals looking to commit fraud. The types of attacks committed are as varied as the 
attackers, and no one solution will be sufficient to mitigate the problem. As banks are critical 
infrastructure whose collapse or damage could have significant consequences for the United 
States and world economy, innovative strategies must be paired with diligence to create an truly 
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